Analyzing Russian human rights groups on the basis of the three key factors of group development during the initial period of regime transition has enabled a rough model of the ideal group to emerge. As with any ideal, there are limitations to the applicability of this model. The local conditions and environment at any given time will dictate the characteristics that in the end will enable a group to best develop. However, the ideal model suggested by this research can provide insights into the current nature of group development and the fate of human rights work in the immediate future. Accordingly, the twenty groups profiled here can be ranked according to their closeness to this ideal (see Table 4).

This research has identified three key factors effecting group development: the scope and clarity of the group’s goals; the priority placed on information networks and services; and the ability to generate local (non-Western) sources of financial support. The evidence presented has shown that there is in fact reason to be cautiously optimistic that many of these groups could survive serious setbacks, both politically and economically. The manner in which Russian human rights groups have developed demonstrates a rising level of organizational maturity and institutional strength, despite the threats posed to groups by social, political, and economic instability associated with the transition period.

The ideal human rights group during the transition period has a well-defined, narrowly focused mandate with goals of particular personal interest to the group’s constituency. These goals are based on very practical, concrete rights issues, as opposed to broader goals supporting universal human rights. In many cases, the group is indigenous to the country or region, effectively taking into consideration issues of local sociocultural and political factors. The group places a priority on short-term, case-related goals. The group addresses long-term development and infrastructure issues to some degree, but these projects remain secondary to immediate casework.

This research has shown that most of the Russian human rights groups today are organized around concrete issues of human rights abuses. Groups tend to have a narrowly defined, very active constituency. Some groups still suffer from vaguely defined goals and poorly conceived group definitions, most apparently the St. Petersburg Independent Group for Human Rights. For the most part, however, these groups are the exception -- not the rule. Commenting on the conditions in 1990 and 1991, Fish observed:

In sum, vaguely defined programs and constituencies, weakly differentiated interests, inchoate organizational integration, and internal divisions remained substantial obstacles to effective aggregation of interests.

In 1995, this situation seems to have been resolved to a great extent. Overall, this parochialization has had (at least for the time being) a positive effect on group development.

Looking down the road, this narrow, crisis-driven approach to group organization calls into question the ability of these groups to develop more long-term, universal rights advocacy programs. However, the fact that many groups do pursue some long-term infrastructure projects in addition to their more immediate casework suggests that they do hold the potential for long-term, broader-based interest advocacy in the future. Groups such as the Moscow Center for Prison Reform and the Independent Psychiatric Association -- both very effective in their recent case-related work and projects -- have at the same time remained active in the creation of legislation and institutional developments affecting their areas of expertise. Both groups have maintained regular dialogues with the relevant state commissions and legal bodies working to formalize changes in the criminal justice and psychiatric fields respectively. This awareness of the need to address fundamental issues of capacity-building and bureaucratic and legal infrastructure illustrates the Russian human rights movement’s increased level of maturity and capability today.

The ideal human rights group during the transition period also places a priority on information -- both connecting to information networks and providing information resources. The group plays an active part in the community of NGOs, especially with members of the human rights movement. The group shares information and experiences, as well as resources where and when appropriate. From such connections, the group benefits organizationally through increased funding and access to more diverse resources, as well as morally from the sense of community within the human rights movement. The group also makes serious efforts to publicize its work, not only locally, but regionally and internationally as well. When possible, the group actively engages in publishing its research and findings and conducts public outreach and civic education programs. Such a high priority placed on information benefits the group both socially, through publicity and outreach, and politically, by generating public attention and influencing public and international opinion.

Contrary to what observers noted early in the transition process, there are in fact vibrant and growing networks of communication and cooperation among human rights group in Russia. Speaking of political associations, Fish noted, "The extent of real organizational linkage and integration was very limited." This research has shown that within the human rights community, there are strong established channels of regular communication. This is especially significant given the early criticism the fledging Russian civil society groups received between 1989 and 1991. It was at this time that many umbrella organizations and informal associations splintered and divided as a result of internal group conflict and rivalries. Today, the relationship between groups for the most part can be characterized as mutually supportive.

The Moscow Research Center for Human Rights Information Network Project holds the promise of putting these networks ‘on-line’ in the near future. Similarly, Express Chronicle has seen a dramatic increase in the number of its regional correspondents communicating via e-mail in the past two years. Although groups in the regions of Russia still remain developmentally behind in comparison to groups in Moscow and St. Petersburg, serious efforts are underway to offer training and resources to the regional groups, enabling them to overcome their relative isolation from the mainstream of NGO development in the urban centers.

This research has also shown that many groups are seizing the opportunity to publish their research and provide information services to the public. Express Chronicle has led the way in this respect with their daily news wire on human rights and the activities of human rights groups around the regions of the NIS. This news wire is now archived on the World Wide Web as well, making this valuable information available globally. Other groups, such as the Glasnost Defense Fund and Citizen Control, are also playing an important role in securing public access to information.

Many groups are actively publishing newsletters, seminar proceedings, research reports and editorial commentaries on human rights issues. Groups with adequate funding embark on their own publishing projects, most notably the Moscow Center for Prison Reform, Memorial and the Moscow Helsinki Group. Groups that do not have the financial resources to publish themselves have consistently taken advantage of public forums, such as newspapers and radio. These venues have proven especially useful for groups such as the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, the Organization "Soldiers’ Mothers," the Association "Wings" and the Right to Life and Human Dignity Society.

Fish observed that under Gorbachev, "state agencies demonstrated a persistent unwillingness, even inability, to recognize independent associations as legitimate vehicles for interest intermediation." In recent years, however, the rise in public awareness of the issues addressed by human rights groups has forced the hand of many politicians. The information provided by groups through their activities and publications has put pressure on officials to respond to accusations of abuses and misconduct. The most potent example of this has been the official government reaction to the activities of the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, which has included the creation of special investigative commissions and presidential inquiries into the concerns of Soldiers’ Mothers groups in the regions. In general, the information capacity of these groups poses a great threat to apathetic political bodies and elites, proving to be the greatest asset groups have to secure their role as intermediaries in state-society dialogue during the transition process.

Concerning the issue of finances, the ideal human rights group during the transition period would be independently self-supporting. That, however, is highly unlikely -- if not outright impossible -- given the recent history and relative youth of human rights groups in Russia today. All NGOs, and especially human rights groups, face an overwhelming threat to their survival because almost no group today can generate enough local funding to survive. Every NGO with which I met during two months of in-country research received some amount of financial support from Western funding organizations. For many of these groups, almost all of their financial resources were obtained through international democratic development grants, the main supporters being the Soros Foundation Open Society, USAID (primarily through the Eurasia Foundation), the National Endowment for Democracy, and the European Union Phare/Tacis Program.

Given this situation, the ideal human rights group would more realistically try to create some degree of security for its financial survival despite its obvious dependence on funding from the West. This translates into the ability to locate and attract local funding sources and adapt non-financial forms of support into the group’s structure. Groups with this ability manage to extract and apply volunteer resources to group needs, utilize donations of goods and services, and engage in resource-sharing with other NGOs. While none of these activities remove the danger of dependence on the West, they would help to create a kind of safety net which would enable groups to continue many aspects of their work if Western support is not available.

Russian human rights groups have not lost sight of the lessons of informal organizations during the Soviet period. Informal channels of organization that formed the basis for many of Russia’s human rights groups today in fact still exist. Personal contacts within the human rights movement still provide the basis for activist networking. Groups have developed more by word of mouth than by public advertising or solicitation. The historical background of these groups has given them years of experience in working within serious financial constraints.

Soldiers’ mothers organizations were numerous, widespread and very active well before the international community took notice and began to provide support. Many groups have at their core a dedicated group of volunteer professionals who provide pro bono services for the human rights community, such as the Russian Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights and the Independent Psychiatric Association. Other groups have incorporated charitable services based on in-kind donations from individuals, businesses and organizations, including the International Society for Human Rights, Memorial, the Association "Wings" and the Tchaikovsky Foundation. Even at their weakest point -- financial sustainability -- Russian human rights groups have proven successful in creating unique ways of adaptation and development.

The case of human rights groups presented here argues for cautious optimism for the future development of Russian civil society organizations as a whole. The three key factors used here to analyze human rights groups can be successfully applied to other civil society organizations, including environmental groups, trade guilds and professional associations, charitable foundations, and other interest groups. The diversity of groups and activities in the Russian civil sector today reflect the desire of individuals to take part in the democratization process. Membership in groups and organizations is beginning to show its benefits to participants. As these groups develop, so to will these benefits.

NGOs show similar strengths with respect to these key factors. The scope and number of groups reflect the wide range of interests being asserted through formal organizations in the non-profit sector. Members of the NGO community have taken steps to learn from one another through conferences and cooperative projects. One such example of community networking is the Profi Nonprofit Group, a group of NGO leaders in Moscow who meet once a month in order to share information and experiences with others in the non-profit sector.

More and more steps are being taken to establish and codify the place of these groups in the sociopolitical theater. In June 1995, a new law on public association was created with significant input from NGOs around the country. Apart from several incidences mainly related to the events in Chechnya, significant progress is being made with regard to freedom of the press and of information. Groups remain free to publish and publicize their activities and to engage in public actions in support of their cause. Groups are actively addressing the need to diversify their support base. With the help of several international agencies, seminars and training on issues of organizational development and fundraising are being conducted in the regions of Russia for a wide variety of NGOs. All of these events suggest that the NGO community is developing with the same level of maturity and success, as are the human rights groups featured in this study.

Although the political and economic future of Russia may still be in question, the future of civil society groups appears to be promising. Serious political change such as abandonment of the Constitution or renewed attacks on civil liberties still pose a threat to the democratic transition process. Increased economic hardships could very likely narrow the field of viable NGOs. Aleksei Smirnov observed with marked caution, "There have been no reforms made that cannot be undone." I would suggest, however, the possible exception of the more subtle sociological changes in the way people conceive of the political and their role as independent actors in a civil society. I argue here that the manner in which civil society organizations have developed during the initial period of regime transition suggests that they can in fact withstand significant social, political and economic turbulence during the transition process.