Chapter 1

The Debate Over Civil Society and Its Future in Russia

Conceptualizing the process of regime change in Russia has proven especially troublesome for observes -- both optimistic and pessimistic about the prospects for reforms to lead to a truly democratic Russia. On the one hand, there is the tendency to oversimplify the highly complex nature of the transition. This has fostered a false sense of expectation, resulting in the disillusionment of many participants and observers when such vast gains in democratic institution building were not made at the outset of the transformation process. On the other hand, there are those who fail to appreciate altogether the relative advances that have been made, most especially with regard to organizational and governance processes (establishing legal channels for interest group advocacy, developing working relationships with administrative and political elites, standardizing group activities) which very often do not create immediately tangible results.

Below, I will examine these arguments with respect to two major issues. First, I will examine the arguments of optimists who saw in Russia a ‘proto-civil society’ prior to 1991. Specifically, I will examine how the early development of neformalnye gruppi was understood in relation to Russia’s democratic development. Second, I will examine arguments made by pessimists who believe that historical predisposition, and the social implications of Russia’s development doomed it to failure. Specifically, I will address comments made with regard to three issues: Russia’s tradition of authoritarian rule pre-dating the Soviet period; the burdens of the communist legacy; and the social conditions and global international climate for regime transformation. Following these assessments, I will present a third option. This approach analyzes the current transition process taking place in Russia by appreciating the complexity of social and historical circumstances influencing the current transition process, while at the same time acknowledging the relative gains already made in the democratization process. This approach stresses on the transitional nature of the emergence of Russian civil society groups since 1991.

In an early assessment of the increasing levels of dissent in the former Soviet Union, David Kowaleski identified the rise of mutually supportive networks among national dissidents across the territories of the Soviet Union. Kowaleski called this phenomenon the "multinationalization of Soviet dissent." He observed:

Although several forces still operate to keep the Soviet Union’s nationalities competing among themselves instead of struggling together against a rather repressive imperialist regime, several contradictory forces are arising which serve to increase cooperative links among dissatisfied members of Soviet nationalities.

This coalescence, as we now know, proved vitally important in creating wide-scale opposition under glasnost and perestroika. Kowaleski suggested that this coming together signified a potential "transnational peace coalition uniting not only several national dissidents in the Soviet Union but abroad as well." Kowaleski is one of a number of authors who saw the nationality question as a function of Soviet domination more than as a historical circumstance pre- and very likely post-dating Soviet rule.

In a different approach to the issue of Soviet dissent, Giuseppe DiPalma claimed that the special circumstances of communism helped to create a dissent more unified and homogeneous than its counterparts under authoritarian regimes. DiPalma stated:

Since communism broke with the past, there were no such complex political targets [historical political opponent - CH] to divide dissenters. This explains why in Eastern Europe one speaks of dissent, whereas in the case of authoritarian regimes one more often speaks of opposition.

Furthermore, DiPalma emphasized that the parallel society which was created in response to communism’s unique claim to social space could very well play a significant role in the future of an emergent post-Soviet civil society.

In the 1970s, the informal arena of the black market came to play an important role in supplementing the inadequacies of the socialist economy. Steve Sampson observed:

In Eastern Europe, highly valued and needed resources are constantly in scarce supply, due either to economic mismanagement or political expediency. This makes informal channels and social networks absolutely vital for the day-to-day existence of virtually all Eastern Europeans.

It is this preexisting system of social relations apparent by the mid-1980s which revisionists thought could blossom into a full-fledged civil society once the limits of communism -- specifically the claim to cognitive superiority, the monopoly of social discourse and the dependence on regime paternalism -- were removed.

A participant in the events made a similar observation regarding this phenomenon in Poland. Bronislaw Geremek noted:

This passage from individual and small-group dissidence to independent mass organizations ... was understood, not only by learned observers but by the participants themselves, to be the first flowering of a new, post-communist civil society.

However, few address the question of whether or not this parallel set of social relations could maintain its cohesion when elevated to the level of an open civil society. As Marcia Weigle pointed out, "All three of the elements necessary for successful social movements most noted in political sociology literature -- established social networks, formal organization and a collective identity -- could be only partly realized in Russia."

Be they political parties or organizations of civil society, the outgrowths of what DiPalma identified as the parallel society would no doubt incur new challenges when faced with the need to consolidate and institutionalize its leadership and constituencies into cohesive forms of free social organization. DiPalma’s proposition fails to elaborate the processes by which the parallel society would emerge from the underground and the challenges and implications involved in formal organization. The gap that exists between informal social relations and formal social organization is characterized by the codification of principles and beliefs, the establishment of organizational procedures and the development of formal and consistent relations with both elements of the state apparatus and the society at large. As will be discussed later in this paper, the manner in which these issues have been resolved in Russian human rights organizations illustrates their strength.

Those involved in the dissent movement, as well as a number of Western observers, believed the impact of their work to be greater than their numbers would suggest. Bronislaw Geremek, advisor to Solidarity in Poland, claimed:

In the eye of the hurricane, in Moscow, hardly one-hundredth part of the people were involved. Yet those days were decisive for the whole of society, for as they wore on, the awareness of a new arrangement of power was taking hold.

The significance of dissent and its broader significance in relation to the distribution of power, however, proved much more tenuous in Russia, where the regime possessed a stronger claim to legitimacy because of its quasi-indigenous origin. Weigle and Butterfield aptly note:

The indigenous development of Marxism-Leninism, the confluence of Soviet and Great Russian national interests, and the accomplishments of the Stalin era (industrialization, superpower status) had afforded the Soviet Communist regime more legitimacy than its counterparts in Central Europe.

Because of the stronger base of regime legitimacy and the lack of ethnic or national homogeneity across the Soviet Empire, the dissent movement in Russia did not generate the same degree of significance vis-à-vis Soviet power. Weigle and Butterfield observed:

Most citizens, in fact, did not identify with its values. Not only did it fail to bridge to social gap in terms of membership or sympathizers, but also there appeared to be no sense of shared values between the intelligentsia members of the dissent movement and the general population.

Kowaleski, DiPalma and Geremek imbued the informal dissent movement with such unity and power that it came as a surprise that civil society did not flourish more quickly after the 1989 and 1991 communist collapses in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union respectively. What these authors failed to take into consideration, however, is the sociocultural complexity of the climate in which independent group existed, especially regarding their ability accurately to reflect the diversity of opinions and values among the varied parts of Soviet or Russian society. Nevertheless, one should not wholly discount their significance. In fact, the degree of development of these informal groups at the time of communist defeat can in various countries help to explain the comparative advantages or disadvantages of one transition over another. As Francis Fukuyama observed, "Indeed, without the concept of a proto-civil society, it would be impossible to account for the great differences in post-communist political developments in Eastern Europe."

The issue of group continuity, as mentioned earlier, plays an integral role in dictating the fate of these groups during the immediate transition period. As Kowaleski and others have pointed out, when compared to the sole, all-encompassing challenge of communist dominance, the dissent movement appears to have a cohesion about it -- a very often misleading appearance of unity. This unity, however, is based on negative premises: groups and movements united by what they are against rather than what they are for. Weigle and Butterfield note that while negative unity proves to be effective during the "defensive" stage of civil society’s emergence, this effectiveness does not carry through into the "emergent" stage which begins with the ouster of the communist regime. The removal of a common enemy has posed significant problems for civil society organizations and political associations alike.

Another approach to this issue of differentiation within the ranks of the proto-civil society is presented by Mark Pomar. He argues, "The problem in the Soviet Union is daunting; there will be civil societies in plural." These civil societies that Pomar envisions result from the ethnic and national mix across the Soviet Union which in effect will create multiple civil societies based on the historical, cultural and national traditions of each group: "The problem with the informal movement in Russia is that while the republics gain from the fact that nationality unites them, nationality divides the Russian groups very much." But not only does the nationality issue divide the Russian informal associations. The lack of any consensus as to what would replace the Soviet system resulted in the inability of groups to make the move from informal opposition to formal representation of a valid alternative. It was for this reason that the impetus for formal recognition ended up coming from the reformist leadership above as opposed to an overwhelming demand from social groups below. This lack of strong and decisive rallying points behind which a true social movement (or movements, for that matter) could be generated makes the process of institutionalizing the vestiges of proto-civil society all the more precarious.

The inherited legacies of communism in Russia, however, do not all work against Russia. The period of Soviet rule did in fact lay some initial groundwork for democracy that was not present in Imperial Russia, however mundane these developments may seem. S. Frederick Starr has pointed out that the process of social transformation has benefited from numerous changes in the past thirty years, often overlooked by Soviet critics. These include rapid urbanization, rising literacy and education levels, and economic development. Moshe Lewin concurs:

Today well educated urban citizens, not backwards peasants, are the largest demographic group... And in ways sometimes overt, sometimes covert, contemporary urban society has become a powerful ‘system maker’, pressuring both political institutions and the economic model to adapt.

While many of the benefits of these developments have gone unacknowledged (or at least were not duly credited to Soviet leadership), Starr claimed:

Advances in education have fostered the individuation and sense of autonomy unleashed by urbanization and economic growth... As this happens, they cross, albeit unconsciously, the ideological fault line running in Western political theory between the writings of Thomas Hobbes, who stresses the individual’s need for security, and those of John Locke, who stresses the right to liberty.

In essence, Starr argues against the proposition that Russians have remained tied to a historical predisposition toward the security of authoritarianism. According to Starr and Lewin, the modernization of Russia has led its society toward a more democratic, individualistic pursuit of rights and liberties by default. This understanding of modernization as democratization by default, with its focus on the development of civil society, represents an entire body of literature that came out mainly during the early years of perestroika. For Starr, urbanization and education were key. For DiPalma, even black market activities provided evidence of discrete democratization. He observed, "When engaged in the second economy, people adhered to norms that were at variance with those of apathy, mediocrity, and dependency."

Perhaps the most well known argument along these lines is Francis Fukuyama’s "end of history" argument. By equating modernization with Western-style democracy and market economy, Fukuyama claims that with the demise of communist rule in the Soviet Union, all other viable options for development have been exhausted. In essence, the "end of history" has been reached. More recently, Fukuyama has reasserted his convictions with specific reference to Russia’s democratic potential. Criticizing what he calls "the new pessimism", Fukuyama argues, "It misses the deeper reality of the temporary situation, and vastly exaggerates the problem we face." In an attempt to put the recent Russian experience in perspective, Fukuyama uses transition ‘successes’ in Asia and Latin America, placing special emphasis on the unlikely economic successes in South Korea, Taiwan, Chile and Mexico.

Politically, Fukuyama seems to be able to discount -- or at least minimize -- the impact of regional and ethnic strife (such as the events in the Balkans and the Caucasus) on the overall democratic transition process. He claims, "The absence today of larger great-power rivalries means that sectional strife will remain regionalized in its impact, however horrendous the consequences may be for local populations." Such conflicts are seen to merely retard -- not endanger -- the natural development of these regions toward inclusion in an ever more interrelated global system. This sentiment for globalization is also echoed in Holm and Sorensen’s Whose World Order?

Perhaps most problematic about Fukuyama’s case against the new pessimism is its failure to address the sociological motivations behind changes that occur in this realm. Fukuyama is perhaps correct in stating that the victory of former communists in Poland and elsewhere only months after their ouster reflects not so much a rejection of reform so much as a desire to moderate the pace of reforms. He fails, however, to make a clear distinction between transition player goals and transitional society’s values. The transition to democracy may very well be motivated simply by the goal of improved material well being. This does not necessarily mean that going through the processes of political liberalization and economic marketization will affect democratic values, instincts and morals within the recipient or transforming society. It is in this respect that Fukuyama’s end of history fails to adequately describe or explain the sociocultural nature of this resulting global society.

The various obstacles to civil society cited above have led to the resurgence of a different, more pessimistic school on the future of Russian democracy. This more pessimistic side of the debate over the nature of Russia’s transition stresses the historical predisposition and social implications challenging the Russian democratic initiative. As Allen Kassof argued in 1964:

The Bolshevization of a society, if it goes on for long enough, is an irreversible process, because it is so intense and so total that it indelibly alters not only the earlier institutional forms but the entire pattern of a population’s expectations of reasonable and workable alternative possibilities for social order.

Many classical totalitarian school theorists stressed the tradition of authoritarianism or patrimonialism in Russia that predated the Bolshevik revolution. Many in this camp, such as Richard Pipes, have stressed the important significance of the convergence of Soviet goals with the historical tradition of Great Russian chauvinism, especially under Stalin.

Now added to this body of literature are numerous theses focusing on the potential consequences of the communist legacy, both institutionally and socioculturally. Stephen Cohen and Kenneth Jowitt have argued that the Marxist-Leninist regime provided a unique combination of modern elements (technology, urbanism, literacy) and "retrogressive" or "neotraditional" elements (political autocracy, charismatic leadership, semi-serfdom and slave labor). What has resulted is a new current of pessimism about the possibility of a democratic Russia.

Jonathan Steele’s Eternal Russia: Yeltsin, Gorbachev and the Mirage of Democracy is one of the most recent contributions to this ‘new pessimism’. Steele points to both the tradition of authoritarianism and the communist legacy, as well as to a number of recent ‘missed opportunities’, to evidence his claim that the chance of Russia truly democratizing -- however slim to begin with -- may have already passed.

The notion of Russia’s authoritarian tendencies -- what Steele calls the "lure of the strong hand" -- dominates much of his argument. He attributes the parliamentary decision in March 1990 to establish an executive presidency not only to the desire to reduce Communist Party power, but also to the urge for a dominant leader. Steele remarked, "At the back of many of their minds lurked the old Russian hankering for a ‘strong hand’." Calls for the use of a strong hand began to appear in the debate over the transition process, bringing back such powerful images of Russian leadership as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. Political players quickly grasped on to these familiar images of strength and Russian dominance at a time during the transition when the first repercussions of economic hardship, growing social unrest, and national strife were rising to the surface. The potency of these images, as well as the growing nostalgia for the discipline under Stalin and social welfare under Brezhnev, were undoubtedly effective in changing public attitudes toward the reform effort. It was also at this time that Russian Orthodoxy was experiencing a revival and voices such as Solzhenitsyn’s were beginning to ring louder with the local population in Russia’s regions.

Were such trends evidence of a terminal Russian hankering for authoritarian leadership, or were these trends more indicative of a logical response of a regime making the transition away from authoritarianism? In fact, many regimes undergoing simultaneous political and economic transitions have seen a similar rise in nostalgia for past periods of stability, despite the nature of the political regime in power. For Steele, the seventy-five years of communist rule in Russia is very telling: "The fact that a totalitarian system had taken hold in Russia and survived for so long was not the malaise itself but the symptom of a deeper disease."

What is the ‘deeper disease’ of which Steele speaks? One aspect, according to Steele, is Russia’s susceptibility to ideological and charismatic leadership. Steele notes, "The Russian intelligentsia has always believed in the power of word over deed, in the force of ideas to change established structures." Now, Russia is at a point where it is trying to adapt to democratic principles of compromise and constituency building rather than messianic-type visions of an ideal leader.

Similar to Rose, Steele argues that disillusionment with Marxism-Leninism has generated a belief that "politics require [s] technical solutions in which values no longer need to be considered." In this respect, communism’s impact on the Russian political mind has not only made ideology taboo, but the concept of party politics taboo as well. Rose stated: "Distrust of party politics is endemic among people for whom ‘the party’ meant exploitative apparatchiki and the pseudoscientific propositions of Marxism-Leninism." Given this distrust of party politics and aversion to any ideology because of negative prior experiences, one is surprised to note the absence of any significant punitive measures taken against the former communist leaders in Russia, unlike the experience of many of their Eastern European counterparts. The Russian transition, from the beginning, has been characterized by its initiation from above, making it an "elite-dominated" democratic transition.

Steele has argued that many of Russia’s chances for laying down some real democratic roots have slipped by, in many cases overlooked politically or misjudged economically. According to Steele, the Yeltsin leadership does not possess a strong desire to create democratic institutions, even if the desire for economic and political reform in general is there. For example, he cites the fact that Yeltsin ‘squandered’ his opportunity to take the lead by establishing his own political party to create a lasting basis for his own political support. He notes, "Yeltsin claimed that as Russia’s leader he should not be allied to any particular political movement or party, but should represent all the people." Steele also notes that many of the current crises in Russia can in some way be traced to the devastating impact of shock therapy.

There are those such as Richard Rose, Weigle and Butterfield and M. Steven Fish who do not, for two main reasons, place such an importance on the role of the informal groups or proto-civil society. The first argument is that the nature of these groups does not make them good candidates for democracy building. The second argument is that, regardless of their character, the importance of these groups diminishes significantly during the period of democratic consolidation.

Even those who stress the importance of these informal associations during the early development of civil society often used stronger caution when speaking specifically about the Russian case. Weigle observed that in the process of formalization, many groups suffered from constant splits over organization, strategy, and personal conflicts, resulting in "a growing sense that the foundations of nascent civil society are proving very weak." M. Steven Fish attributes this weakness to the decay, corruption and disorganization of state institutions, socioeconomic instability and the social and political legacies of totalitarian rule. As for the progress of proto-civil society groups, Fish notes that, as a result of years of stifled identity and interest assertion: "The interests, issues, and divisions around which political and social organizations normally develop are now far more weakly present and much less differentiated in Russia than most other countries."

Stephen Cohen has noted that the main organizers of informal organizations under communism rallied around a narrow set of specific social problems effecting both state and society: falling levels of productivity; decline in the Russian birth rate; the persistence of cynicism, alcoholism, abortion and divorce. Interestingly enough, Fish contends that one very likely possibility for the future of Russian civil society groups is parochialization -- suggesting a very diversified set of groups, albeit narrowly focused. He states, "In this scenario, the voluntary sector would grow in strength vis-à-vis the state, but its dominant forms of organization would represent particularistic, inward-looking, or ‘anomic’ tendencies." This has, in fact, been the case, as will be examined later in further detail.

The willingness of society to accept these groups as intermediaries also remains in question. Richard Rose has questioned the ability of informal groups to serve as a basis for future political parties, as many observers have suggested. Noting what he calls the "legacy of distrust", Rose argues that years of massive distrust of the Communist Party have severely damaged the notion of party politics in general in Russia. Rose points to the results of recent public opinion surveys to support his case. Based on nearly 2,000 face-to-face interviews conducted nationwide in the summer of 1993, seven out of ten respondents said that they did not trust the key institutions of civil society. In addition, 93% claimed to distrust political parties in general. The ability of civil society groups and political parties to overcome these historical legacies will come only with time and experience. In the meantime, however, the ability of these groups to function as effective intermediaries between the state and society has yet to be fully realized.

A number of authors have argued that civil society groups will play a decreasingly important role as the process of transition moves from de-construction of communism to the institutionalization of a new political and social form. Fish argues, "Once the tasks of transition have been accomplished, the challenges of consolidation are thought to be mostly matters of political institutionalization. During this latter phase, the organizations of civil society normally play only a supporting role." Taking this argument one step further, Fish suggests that the lack of a robust civil society may in fact prove to be advantageous, given the difficulty of economic and social sacrifices that need to be made during the transition process. In such cases, the end goals of political democratization and economic marketization often take priority over the means used to obtain them, resulting in the use of seemingly undemocratic -- sometimes authoritarian -- means to pursue democratic ends. This approach has received criticism from a number of scholars in analyses of international democratization efforts.

Huntington argued in 1991 that the current era of democratic transitions constitutes the "third wave" of democratization. While acknowledging that democratic consolidation in Russia would be the single most dramatic gain for democracy since World War II, Huntington discouragingly notes that the original causes of the third wave have been virtually exhausted, clearing the path for the expected reverse wave. Contributing to the reverse of the democracy wave, Huntington cites: weakness of democratic values among key elite groups and the public; economic setbacks; social and political polarization resulting from the rapid introduction of reforms during the democratization process; determination of the upper class groups to exclude populist groups from political power, resulting in drastically increased corruption; breakdown of law; intervention by non-democratic outside forces; or ‘reverse snowballing’ caused by the collapse or overthrow of democracies. Holding Russia up to these potential (in some cases very real) scenarios, the picture does not look good.

While many of these arguments help to add historical and/or practical context to the often idealistically driven arguments of perestroika-period civil society literature, this pessimistic body of literature tends to replace possibility with predetermined probability. Alexander Yanov has argued that neither of these bodies of literature can adequately explain the "freeze and thaw" cycle of Soviet leadership. While the totalitarian school cannot explain the repeated rise of periods of reform, the revisionist school cannot explain the continual failure of these reforms.

The relative gains made in democracy-building since 1989 -- the growth and diversity of civil society groups and civic participation, the beginnings of legal and judicial reform, the process of institution-building -- have grossly been understated, when acknowledged at all. The inadequacy of these bodies of literature to effectively comment on the current transition process today stems from the fact that they do not take into consideration the transitional nature of recent reforms. The simultaneous nature of political, economic and social reform has created a unique climate for regime development. As a result, a new approach must be taken in order to more accurately explain the emergence of the post-Soviet Russian State. I will refer to this new approach as transitional emergence.

Current democratization projects face many new challenges that were not factors in earlier attempts at democratic state building. First generation democracies were built upon the rubble of long, protracted wars and violent conflicts. In addition, these democratic states emerged only after a large-scale change in international borders. Today the international community asks transitioning states not only to accomplish state- and nation-building efforts within the existing territorial borders -- regardless of how arbitrary they may have been drawn -- but also to do so while averting war and respecting a mature level of human rights. This is to say nothing about the historical changes which have taken place since the first democracies were formed, making the international political and economic environment all the more inhospitable to transition processes. In essence, countries are trying to 'reform' before the country itself has been clearly defined.

Potentially damaging effects resulting from transitional emergence can be found in economic, political and social spheres of reform. Economically, the international climate effects the transition process in a unique way. The global market makes economic transformation more challenging because of the complexities that the market brings to poorly economically developed countries trying to enter the game. Increased competition and regionalization has created political and economic gateways that need to be accessed. The link between such economic and political groupings dictates their priority and interdependence in the transition processes. Economic reforms create economic instability. Economic shock therapy and privatization in Russia initially reeked havoc on the monetary system and has sent unemployment skyrocketing. The climate for workers became unstable, as did the investment climate for business and industry.

Another major concern for transitioning states is the difficulty in assuring both economic growth and progressive redistribution during the transition period. The obstacle to the development of effective redistribution patterns most often comes from elite-dominated transition processes where previous political and/or economic leaders seek to preserve their privileged status in the redistribution of benefits from modernization. Sorensen and Karl have commented on this problem, referring to it in terms of 'restricted' or 'frozen' democracies. In Russia’s case, redistribution patterns have consistently favored a small elite, resulting in a widening of the gap in income differential. Even in late 1995 when the economic situation seemed to be improving for business and industry, parallel increases in basic wages and the standard of living were not immediately forthcoming.

Regime transition poses a great threat to political elites who held power under the previous regime. In Russia, the large number of former communist party elites now occupying leadership positions in Russian democratic institutions complicates the democratic development of such institutions. Elites seeking to maintain power and influence can lead to renewed corruption in young democratic bodies such as the Parliament and the Presidential Administration. Political instability and the unclear channels of political power in new democratic institutions make the role of the lobbyist or interest group all the more difficult. Often it is difficult to find the actual locus of real political power, making it difficult to address concerns to the proper individuals or bodies.

The degree to which rule of law has developed at the outset of the transition process also plays a major role in the speed and relative success of reforms. Since the rule of law is a mechanism by which changes in social, state and economic relationships are enforced, a weakness in this area significantly effects the possibility of further democratic advances. The rule of law includes elements of both normative value judgment and pragmatic issues of enforcement. Although dramatic changes may take place 'on the books', changes in practical behavior or enforcement are not guaranteed. Rule of law involves not only the ability of a regime to pass appropriate legislation, but also -- and perhaps more importantly -- the ability of central leadership to publicize adequately new policies and of local and regional leadership to adapt to them. Adaptation is made simpler when the transitioning regime has effectively fostered social trust in new institutions of democracy. But as many have noted, engendering the trust of the masses can pose an enormous challenge in places where there is a large carry-over of leadership from the former regime.

Socially, a dynamic trend toward increased globalization of the non-governmental sector is taking effect. This tightening of the global social community has brought with it increasing levels of social expectations and demands upon transitioning states to provide a standard of living parallel to that of well-established democracies. Political and economic instability also carried over into society in the form of severe skepticism. Increased competition in the work force as well as inexperience with democratic institutions and associations help to make social reform and adaptation more difficult.

Claus Offe has stressed the potentially damaging impact such increasing demands can have on managing social policy during the transition period. Because of the economic burdens of underdeveloped and failed political and economic strategies, he argues, the state is forced in many cases to choose between social security issues on the one hand and economic reforms on the other. Former communist transition cases provide the perfect example of this dilemma. Social services provided under socialism can no longer be financially supported by the state and as a result are abandoned, often before the economic reform process has created alternative sources for social safety net services.

More optimistically, transitional emergence provides social interest groups with the unique opportunity to influence the basic structure of the new regime. Although lobbying and interest assertion can become very murky as a result of political instability, groups can in many cases take part in the creation of new institutions. One major way to influence this process is through the creation of new legislation governing social and political interaction. In many instances, civil society groups have provided consultative services for the legal and political committees developing such legislation. The increased flow of information also enhances social opportunity during transitional emergence. Because of the overlap in many areas of reform, information itself becomes a much more valuable commodity. Groups availing themselves to information networks and providing information services for their constituencies dramatically increase their potential influence on the processes of reform.

In analyzing current democratization projects, the question arises: at what point have bare minimums of democracy been laid so as to facilitate a period of consolidation. Can or should Russia (or any other transitioning regime for that matter) stop debating over the nature and design of what a democratic Russia will look like and move to ensure the survival of the constitution, private property rights and the political structure as it now stands, before expanding the scope of constitutional rights, the degree of economic privatization and political decentralization? To a certain extent, this line of questioning inevitably leads back to the dilemma of finding that fine line of demarcation setting apart those rights which will or will not be set aside in the name of development.

Here we see that human rights groups can play an important role in managing this delicate balance during the immediate transition period. It is important to realize how certain rights -- such as the right to freedom of association and freedom of speech -- can help to create channels through which other rights can be pursued. It is for this reason that the examination of how human rights groups fare during the initial phase of transition can provide extremely insightful commentary on the transition process as a whole. Paying attention to these pivotal rights issues at the outset of transition can help to secure more open avenues for change in the future.

One must be aware that the argument to prioritize one set of rights in lieu of another can itself be used to justify abuses. Controversy over this issue has historically broken down into debate between social economic and cultural rights on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the other. This dichotomy defined the rights debate throughout the Cold War. When pursued in moderation, however, an appropriately prioritized agenda in human rights advocacy (namely seeking the guarantee to right of free association) can help to solidify young democratic institutions while at the same time minimizing the threat posed to transitioning regimes by the expansion of citizen rights.

Human rights in theory tend to be wonderfully idealistic, but the translation of these ideals into effective policy -- especially during the transition period -- poses significant difficulties. For international human rights agencies, defining the scope and method of their advocacy becomes more difficult when the issue of cultural relativism is taken into consideration. While techniques such as stakeholder analysis can be effective ways for groups to explore this issue and better understand the potential impact their work can have on a given country's democratization process, these techniques do not fully resolve all issues regarding cultural relativism. In order to minimize the potentially disruptive effects of international advocacy of human rights and civil society in general, more attempts must be made to integrate domestic policies and international policies of development support. Because of the political and economic instability of transitioning regimes, civil society organizations -- both international and indigenous -- need to be all the more aware of the ways in which their work can complicate -- or, for that matter, facilitate -- other related processes of change.